Elizabeth Anscombe's virtue ethics, as outlined in her seminal work "Modern Moral Philosophy," represents a departure from traditional utilitarian or deontological ethical frameworks. Her approach, often characterized as Aristotelian, emphasizes the importance of virtues in ethical deliberation and decision-making.
Anscombe argues for a return to virtue ethics, focusing on the development of virtuous competencies rather than abstract rules or consequences. Virtue ethics, according to Anscombe, emphasizes the cultivation of virtues such as courage, justice, and benevolence. These virtues guide individuals in making morally sound decisions.
Anscombe criticizes both utilitarianism and deontology for their shortcomings, arguing that they lack a proper foundation for understanding moral obligations. Consequentialism is seen as too focused on outcomes, often leading to morally dubious actions for the sake of a perceived greater good.
Deontology is criticized for providing rules without a clear justification for their moral weight.
Anscombe challenges the notion of "right action" as an oversimplified concept without a solid foundation. She argues against the idea that an action is right or wrong solely based on its conformity to a rule or its consequences.
Anscombe emphasizes the role of practical reasoning or "good sense" in ethical decision-making.
Practical reasoning involves a nuanced consideration of circumstances, virtues, and the particular context of a situation. Anscombe's virtue ethics draws inspiration from Aristotle's ethics, particularly in its emphasis on the cultivation of virtues as a means to achieve eudaimonia (flourishing).
Anscombe's virtue ethics seeks to move away from absolutistic notions of "right action" and toward nuanced, good sense deliberation. Contemporary progressive feminists are more likely to be aligned with deontological or utilitarian approaches, emphasizing rights or consequences rather than virtues (even those that adopt a pragmatic perspective will carry such notions in their epistemic toolkits and apply them in varying degrees as circumstances seem to warrant). Anscombe intended virtue ethics to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of ethics, moving away from rigid rules and consequences.
Anscombe's Catholic background and her anti-abortion stance are integral aspects of her ethical framework. Some progressive feminists criticize her Catholicism and anti-abortion stance as incompatible with feminist ideals, especially those advocating for reproductive rights. It may even be the case that this point of contention is what motivated their pursuit of a virtue ethic that might be more suitable for their own purposes.
Contemporary critiques, especially from progressive feminists, may argue that virtue ethics can be perceived as regressive or incompatible with certain feminist principles. The curiously stark absence of the notion of justice and the shift towards emphasizing charity in certain strands of feminist literature on virtue ethics can be seen as a reflection of a broader evolution in ethical discourse. Feminist scholars, particularly those influenced by care ethics or relational ethics, have shifted emphasis from justice to charity or care.
Certain strands of feminist virtue ethics have been criticized for downplaying or neglecting the concept of justice. Instead, they may prioritize virtues such as compassion, empathy, and care without explicitly addressing broader issues of justice. This move effectively renders moral truths relative, meaning that given enough rhetorical gymnastics, one could excuse any manner of questionable character.
Care ethics, which emphasizes caring relationships and the moral significance of care work, often frames care as a primary virtue. This virtue is associated with qualities like empathy, compassion, and attentiveness to the needs of others. The emphasis on charity in some feminist writings can be seen as a response to individual needs and concrete situations, often in contrast to justice, which might be seen as more abstract and systemic. This move opens the door for bias and discrimination. Once one adopts an ethic of care as their primary virtue, the virtuous life depends on one's ability to identify and intervene, to indeed assume stewardship over, the most "vulnerable" among us. This project requires a sort of grievance calculus, achieved in the notion of intersectionality, in which one's value is determined by a combinatorics of perceived oppression. Care theory, falling under the umbrella of virtue ethics, has influenced aspects of social justice discourse. The shift from justice to care in some feminist discourses may appear paradoxical given the signifier "justice" in terms such as "social justice". Justice had traditionally been a central concern for feminism in addressing systemic inequalities and discrimination. Contemporary social justice movements, particularly those influenced by critical studies and postmodernism, are more so about challenging established norms and structures. They may emphasize the experiences of marginalized groups and the "deconstruction" of power dynamics. From a postmodern perspective, justice is seen as a social construct used to maintain power structures. This can lead to the view that efforts for justice are, in reality, struggles for power. Social justice then is more about power than justice. From this perspective, movements may focus on empowerment and coalition-building as strategies for challenging established power structures.
The notion of "charity" in the context of social justice movements can be seen as a form of wealth redistribution framed as addressing historical injustices and systemic inequalities. The notion of sacrifice for the greater good is central to social justice culture. Within the context of social justice culture, the concept of "charity" can take on various forms that align with the pursuit of positive rights, special accommodations, reparations, diversity quotas, identity-based scholarships, grants, subsidies, and other special privileges. The emphasis on sacrifice is meant to strengthen the bonds within the political coalition, fostering a shared commitment to collectivist ideals. When we consider how many of the special accommodations meant to correct for supposed inequities ultimately amount to reverse discrimination, we see clearly that justice just isn't really a virtue for social justice warriors. When we consider what they have meant to replace justice with, that of charity, we see the means by which they mean to disrupt existing power structures. In the end, the social justice warrior is exposed as merely a social charity warrior, whose concern is not by what criterion might we deem an act virtuous in the first place, but whether the consequence of an action happens to strengthen one's political coalition. What we have then, is a Leftist political strategy masquerading as a moral theory, all the while branding itself as virtuous.
A more pragmatic approach would have us broaden our concern for consequences beyond identity politics to include such practical considerations such as whether a moral truth candidate might stand to advance or retard the pursuit of individual and collective ideals. We ought to consider to what degree accepting something as morally true might contribute to overall flourishing, as understood as some manifestations of human excellence. Remember, an ideal represents the best we can imagine. Our ideals might not always aim for perfection but they do aim for what's optimal. In the liberal tradition of the West, we take justice and truth to be cardinal virtues in which democratic societies must possess. Anything short of this is illiberalism. Taken together, the shift away from justice and the postmodern turn expose contemporary virtue ethics as committed to neither what is fair nor what is true, and indeed antithetical to good-sense. Such lofty concepts are often depicted as antiquated relics of oppression wielded by some form of supremist or another. What emerges is a virtue ethics that has no concern for human excellence as excellence fundamentally requires the pursuit of collective ideals such as truth, justice, and practical competency. Social justice culture manages to take both virtue ethics and collective living and pervert them into gross bastardizations of what they might ideally be.
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