"Meno" is one of Plato's Socratic dialogues that explores the nature of virtue and the possibility of whether virtue can be taught. The dialogue takes place between Socrates and Meno, a young Thessalian aristocrat, and it begins with Meno asking Socrates whether virtue can be taught. This question leads to a broader inquiry into the nature of virtue and knowledge.
The dialogue is structured around a series of questions and answers, with Socrates employing his characteristic method of elenchus, a form of cooperative argumentative dialogue to stimulate critical thinking and illuminate ideas. Throughout the conversation, Socrates engages Meno in a discussion about the definition and nature of virtue, particularly moral virtue.
One key aspect of the dialogue is the famous "Meno's Paradox," where Meno argues that if you don't already know what virtue is, you cannot inquire about it, as you wouldn't recognize a correct answer if you received one. Socrates responds to this paradox by introducing the idea of innate knowledge, suggesting that the soul possesses knowledge from previous experiences.
The dialogue also delves into the relationship between virtue and knowledge. Socrates proposes that virtue is a kind of knowledge, and therefore, if virtue can be taught, it is a matter of imparting knowledge. However, this leads to further questions about what knowledge is and how it is acquired.
While the "Meno" does not provide clear-cut answers to its central questions, it serves as a platform for exploring important philosophical themes, such as the nature of virtue, the possibility of innate knowledge, and the relationship between virtue and knowledge. The dialogues of Plato, including the "Meno," are often open-ended, inviting readers to engage in critical thinking and draw their own conclusions about the topics discussed.
We might consider the dialogue from a pragmatic perspective, in which values and ideals serve as benchmarks for human behavior, directing individuals toward virtuous actions in the pursuit of what they deem valuable.
Ideals, as optimized expressions of values, guide individuals to seek excellence in the realization of deeply held convictions. The inclination towards virtue in the pursuit of excellence raises ethical questions, particularly when individuals shape their social and material environments to align with their affective proclivities. The transformative capacity of individuals poses an ethical challenge, highlighting the intricate interplay between personal values and the broader ethical landscape.
Considering deliberation as a human practice, its alignment with the pursuit of excellence places it within the domain of virtue ethics. This shift leaves the nature and purpose of epistemology in question. If the popular conception of epistemology, centered on justifying true beliefs, is supplanted by a focus on effective deliberation absorbed into virtue ethics, the very essence of epistemology is called into doubt. The amalgamation of "logos" and "episteme" prompts contemplation on the remaining relevance of the "epistemic" in this evolving intellectual landscape. The inquiry extends to whether epistemology, stripped of its conventional moorings, retains a distinct identity and purpose in contemporary philosophical discourse. The conceptual reshaping of epistemology raises profound questions about its existence and function, challenging scholars to redefine the boundaries and significance of this intellectual endeavor.
One possible solution comes about when recognizing that epistemology is not, and cannot be, a theory of what constitutes good knowledge detached from human purposes. Epistemology then, is not a theory of knowledge but an exercise in theorizing about knowledge. Epistemology entails taking that which is known and abstracting out in order to reveal new problems, ignorances, and questions. In this view, epistemology is more so about the unknown then the known, or rather, it carves a path to the known through the unknown.
It is instructive to consider a distinction between episteme and techne and consider whether all knowledge and all that is cognizable comes from techne or practical experience, in which knowledge is embodied and extended in social and material "devices". Episteme may merely be a linguistic manipulation of these devices geared at generating new questions, ignorances, and problems that can only present themselves if having been first encountered in lived experience, because otherwise, such a thing would be incognizable.
This view has profound implications for imagination, as it implies that nothing one imagines is created in a vacuum or detached from previous experience. Even the wildest thing one can imagine is constrained by what is imaginable. Another implication is that such a thing as a square-circle or other logical peculiarities cannot be thought of and worked with in any meaningful way, which means specifically that the concept of a square-circle does not foster the expectation that said concept will work or be operational in practice. Owing to this the concept cannot be expected to reveal new questions, ignorances, or problems, at least, not any more so than any other random string of nonsense might. We shouldn't assume that simply because something can be represented in linguistic expression that it can be represented in phenomenal experience. That which is linguistic is not always cognizable in subjective experience nor realizable in objective experience. In other words, what is detached from experience is incognizable and the incognizable is useless, therefore techne is the sole concern of the epistemic.
The fact that one can rationalize their way into any manner of absurd counter-factual belief does not negate the fact that the cognitive functioning involved is geared toward organizing and making sense of practical experience so that one can form predictions or hypotheses, perhaps even idealized guide-posts, about the future. Furthermore, it remains to be seen if this feature of the epistemic to recombine and abstract things out to exaggerated and even absurd levels is a design flaw or merely a misunderstood feature. The fact that we can encounter a circle and a square and ponder the possibility of a square-circle doesn't mean we can represent such a thing in phenomenal experience. The concept is not merely a meaningless string of words but rather a string of meaningless connections between otherwise meaningful words. Abduction helps in the generation of new questions or ignorances. When faced with a situation or a set of data, abduction allows one to propose hypotheses or explanations that can then be explored or tested. Abduction contributes to the process of moving from subjective truthiness, grounded in practical know-how (techne), toward a more objective understanding. By continually refining and adapting your hypotheses through experimentation, one aims to approach a more universally applicable and objective truth.
Abduction, in this context, becomes a tool for engineering future knowledge. It allows one to actively shape and improve one's understanding by iteratively generating and testing hypotheses, creating a dynamic and evolving body of knowledge. Abduction is a matter of thinking about knowledge in terms of hypothetical propositions. The "epistemic" is merely the linguistic manipulation of concepts which emerge through the development of techne.
In this view, epistemology is not about establishing truth for truth is established in action and is embodied in neuropathways as well as extended into the external world and instantiated in material and social devices. When one applies logos to epistemic matters, they are not attempting to justify belief, they are attempting to take an already established attitudinal habit of action and discover new ignorances by projecting out in anticipation of how well said knowledge might operate in future practice. The question as to how to justify a belief is replaced by, or is perhaps logically equivalent to, some manner of degree in which new and useful questions can be generated.
In this perspective, the value of knowledge is its explanatory power, which is a combination of 1) demystifying or optimizing what is already there to be considered and 2) the subsequent fact that demystifying or optimizing a concept leads to an exponential increase in new and relevant problems or questions. In this view, a "thing" fails to count as knowledge if doesn't make sense of anything or facilitate optimization while subsequently failing to open up new avenues of exploration. This view recognizes that knowledge is not merely about static truths but involves an ongoing process of exploring, demystifying, and generating further inquiries. The value of knowledge lies both in its explanatory power (techne) and in the potential generation of new and pertinent questions (episteme).
This perspective highlights the continuity of experience and knowledge whereas the static conception of knowledge would have us falsely believe that, while knowledge acquisition is often domain specific, epistemic truths are somehow incapable of influencing other domains. Knowing that the King of France is Louis XIV is said to be good for just that. But anyone that reflects on this knowledge, will find as emerging free floating rationales such questions as to whether other kings exist or perhaps you might wonder where a king might draw his authority. We might wonder if France even has a king.
While specific knowledge may be acquired within distinct domains, the dynamic nature of thought and reflection can lead to the emergence of broader, cross-domain inquiries. Seemingly isolated facts, like who the king of France is, can prompt broader contemplations about monarchy, authority, and the existence of other kings. It underscores that knowledge is not confined to isolated compartments but can trigger a cascade of questions and reflections that extend beyond the initial context. The value of a theory or belief is indeed a matter of practical expectation, but this value is to be measured in the relevant and ideally falsifiable questions that assuming such an expectation generates. So when pragmatism speaks of practical consequences and success, they are really getting at the question as to what degree our attitudinal habits of action can be expected to be conducive to epistemic continuity, both historically in terms of fitting into a pre-existing web of belief, as well as presumptively, as we anticipate the successful amelioration of new ignorances generated by epistemic deliberation.
Success of an attitudinal habit of action, as emphasized by pragmatism, is contingent on its contribution to epistemic continuity. The historical fit into a web of belief and the anticipatory potential for ameliorating new ignorances are integral aspects of this evaluation, providing a nuanced understanding of how practical consequences contribute to the effectiveness of our cognitive frameworks. Here we have a degree of division of labor between techne and episteme in which techne justifies knowledge through principles of embodied and extended mind (unconsciously fixes a belief in one's web of beliefs, which is essentially a neural map) while episteme seeks to further sophisticate and scrutinize consciously such tentatively held associations by testing their overall continuity or usefulness in terms of expected outcomes.
This division of labor highlights a dynamic interplay between the practical application and the critical examination of knowledge, emphasizing both the pragmatic and evaluative dimensions of our cognitive processes. By emphasizing the importance of generating new and useful questions, testing the continuity and usefulness of beliefs, and recognizing the dynamic nature of knowledge, this account is in contrast to the conservative nature of the more standard analytical epistemology, which resists radical alterations in epistemic judgments.
Epistemology is about taking what is pragmatically justified through techne and abstracting into future situations and scenarios in the pursuit of moving from the subjective elements of tecnhe toward the objective and perhaps universal truthiness that can be shared and applicable among people. Epistemology involves taking what is pragmatically justified through techne (practical know-how or skill) and abstracting it into future situations. This process aims to move from the subjective "truthiness" that results from otherwise objective techne toward a more objective and potentially universal truth that can be shared and applied among people.
The emphasis on the pursuit of moving from subjective to more objective and universally applicable knowledge suggests a forward-looking and iterative aspect of epistemology. It underscores the idea that epistemic thinking involves not only justifying existing practices but also exploring and adapting them for future scenarios, contributing to a broader and more shared understanding of truth.
A potential contradiction involves the role of techne in providing what seems like immediate and objective knowledge, which might conflict with the idea that episteme is the process of moving from subjective truthiness toward more objective and universal truth. The key to resolving this lies in understanding the nuanced relationship between techne and episteme within the framework of ignorance epistemology.
In the context of ignorance epistemology, techne indeed provides immediate and objective knowledge, especially in the form of knowing-how. When someone learns a new skill or observes a specific technique, there is some immediate understanding of how to perform that action. This immediate knowledge, however, is considered rudimentary and tied to subjective affective appraisals. In other words, it might be objective in the sense that it deals with practical skills, but it's limited in sophistication and may not be universally applicable.
The recognition of the limitations of this immediate, objective knowledge is where episteme comes into play. While techne offers practical know-how and objective facts related to specific skills, episteme involves a more reflective and abstracting process. Episteme takes what is pragmatically justified through techne and endeavors to move beyond the immediate, subjective understanding. It seeks to generalize experiences, explore broader implications, and contribute to a more sophisticated and shared understanding of truth.
In this way, ignorance epistemology anticipates the potential criticism by acknowledging that techne does provide a form of objective knowledge, but it's an unsophisticated form limited to immediate practicalities. The role of episteme is then to refine and generalize this knowledge, making it more objective and potentially applicable across various contexts.
The fact that techne begins with immediate, objective knowledge doesn't negate the purpose of episteme. Episteme serves to refine, generalize, and move beyond the immediate and subjective aspects of techne, contributing to a more comprehensive, universally applicable, and operationally excellent, understanding of truth.
Such epistemic excellence is taken to be a property of reasoning strategy and practice. This perspective addresses the error of treating epistemic knowledge as if it can, in actuality as opposed to merely metaphorically, be somehow different than ethical knowledge. Once one recognizes that all knowledge pertains to know-how, and that epistemic knowledge as traditionally conceived does not in fact exist, it becomes clear that knowledge is about right or correct action. Epistemic or theoretical knowledge is emphatically not knowledge at all. It's an oxymoron. The epistemic deals in the unknown and this is why it is prone to flights of fancy. Epistemic endeavoring is about working with knowledge to better engineer future knowledge by experimenting with it via abstraction and abduction.
"Epistemic" simply means thinking about knowledge with thoughts or language. Theory is extracted from practice. There is no such thing as epistemic knowledge, or rather, that which we call epistemic knowledge is merely the linguistic articulation of what is fundamentally material. The thinking that we do about knowledge doesn't result in some new special transmogrified knowledge. It results in hypotheses that may become knowledge if justified in experience. There is no distinct category of epistemic knowledge. Knowledge emerges from practical engagement and application, and the process of thinking about this knowledge doesn't lead to a fundamentally different or special form of knowledge. The "epistemic" involves thinking about knowledge rather than representing a unique form of knowledge. The focus of epistemology should be on the practical and dynamic aspects of engaging with knowledge, rather than on a separate realm of epistemic knowledge. Epistemology could perhaps stand as a philosophy of science inasmuch as it focuses on embodied, extended knowledge as practical know-how in inquiring how best to generate new questions, problems, or ignorances from said practical knowledge. But if this were the case then the crux of the matter would still be decided by virtue ethics. So, while epistemology may stand as the practice of expanding knowledge, it will ultimately depend on virtue ethics as a means of justifying said practices. In this way, epistemology, either as means of justifying truth, or as a means of justifying methods of good deliberation, just doesn't exist.
The virtue-ethics-centric perspective asserts that "epistemology" is fundamentally about practical know-how. This view rejects the existence of a separate epistemic knowledge category, arguing that all knowledge pertains to know-how and is, therefore, fundamentally practical. The crux of epistemic inquiry is the generation of new questions, problems, or ignorances from practical knowledge, a process that involves experimentation and abstraction. Traditional pragmatist epistemology often aligns with the idea of "fixing belief," aiming to establish firm foundations and justifications for what is considered knowledge. This aligns with the more foundationalist approaches in epistemology.
However, our further reconstruction shifts the emphasis from fixing belief to expanding and revising belief. The dynamic and pragmatic nature of knowledge within this framework acknowledges the evolving and provisional character of beliefs.
Traditional epistemology often seeks certainty and stability in beliefs. In contrast, the reconstructed view embraces a more flexible and dynamic understanding of knowledge that suggests that there is no certainty or stability beyond practical certainty and reliability. Episteme, in this context, involves not merely the establishment of fixed beliefs but an exploration of the conditions under which beliefs might need revision or abandonment.
The focus on revising belief implies a readiness to adapt to new information and experiences. Beliefs are not treated as static entities but as hypotheses subject to continuous testing and refinement. This aligns with the pragmatic idea that the value of beliefs lies in their practical consequences and utility in navigating the complexities of lived experiences. "Ignorance Epistemology", which emphasizes the dynamic and continuous nature of knowledge generation through effective deliberation, can be related to the Meno. In the Meno, Socratic inquiry involves a process of questioning and dialogue to explore the nature of virtue and knowledge. Ignorance epistemology aligns with Socratic questioning, as it recognizes that the essence of epistemology lies in theorizing about knowledge, abstracting from what is known to reveal new problems and ignorances. Socratic inquiry, in this context, becomes a method for actively engaging with and revealing these ignorances.
The emphasis on abduction as a tool for engineering future knowledge resonates with the Socratic method used in the "Meno." Socrates engages in a form of virtuous inquiry, challenging preconceived notions and prompting Meno to explore new hypotheses and explanations about the nature of virtue. Abduction, in this sense, mirrors the kind of hypothetical reasoning and exploration seen in the dialogue.
The emphasis on the continuity of experience and knowledge, where seemingly isolated facts can lead to broader, cross-domain inquiries, relates to the holistic nature of the "Meno" discussion. The dialogue doesn't confine itself to a narrow exploration of virtue but extends into broader ethical considerations and the interconnectedness of knowledge across domains.
The pragmatic aspect of ignorance epistemology, where success is contingent on the contribution to epistemic continuity, aligns with the practical orientation of Socratic inquiry in the "Meno." Socrates' method is not solely about theoretical knowledge but also about the practical implications of understanding virtue and its teachability.
Meno initiates the dialogue by asking whether virtue is something that can be taught. This question forms the starting point for Socratic inquiry into the nature of virtue and the possibility of its teachability. In this pragmatic perspective, virtues are, often objective, value-facts, and being virtuous involves recognizing or learning to appreciate these value-facts within various contextual factors, including epistemic and social contexts. This perspective emphasizes the potential objectivity as well as the contextual nature of virtues. In this sense, virtues, including those pertaining to successful deliberation, are indeed teachable.
The dynamic interplay between the practical application and critical examination of knowledge in ignorance epistemology is reflected in the unfolding dialogue of the "Meno." Socratic questioning involves both applying knowledge in practical inquiry and critically examining existing beliefs, mirroring the continuous and evaluative nature of this pragmatic perspective.
Ignorance epistemology offers a lens through which to view the "Meno" as a dynamic exploration of virtue and knowledge, where Socratic inquiry serves as a method for actively engaging with and refining understanding through the recognition of ignorances and the generation of new questions. The interplay between values, effective deliberation, and the pursuit of excellence found in ignorance epistemology aligns with the broader ethical considerations in the dialogue. Furthermore, ignorance epistemology, by situating itself within virtue ethics, finally gives self proclaimed epistemologists something good to do.
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